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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BETH S. LEWIS,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.
THOMAS G. PIKE, individually,
THE LOCKHART COMPANY, a Utah
Industrial Loan Corporation;
and AMERICAN BANKERS LIFE
ASSURANCE COMPANY OF FLORIDA,
a foreign corporation,
DefendantsRespondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 18195

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was brought by plaintiff (appellant) against
defendants (respondents) for recovery due to an alleged failure
to obtain credit life insurance on the life of plaintiff's
(appellant's) husband in connection with a loan.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants'

(respondents') Motion for Summary Judgment was

heard on December 3, 1981.

The District Judge, Honorable G. Hal

Taylor, granted a summary judgment in favor of defendants
(respondents).

Judgment was entered on December 15, 1981.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents ask that· the summary judgment entered in this
matter be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Application for Loan from Lockhart by Lewis'
In early summer 1979, application was made by Darrel E. Lewis
and Beth S. Lewis for a loan from The Lockhart Company ("Lockhartn)
in the amount of $18,000.

(Beth

hereinafter "Lewis Deposition").

s. Lewis Deposition, pp. 22-23,
Prior to July 2, 1979, Mr.

Thomas Pike of Lockhart contacted Mr. Lewis to discuss a matter
relative to the Lewis' home (not related to the $18,000.00 loan)
as Lockhart was then receiving the payments on the contract pursuant to which the Lewis' were purchasing the home, which
payments at one time were going through Tracy-Collins.
Deposition, p.

28).

(Lewis

It was during thiq conversation that Mr.

Lewis inquired about Lockhart making an $18,000 loan so that Mr.
Lewis could consolidate all of his debts into one and in said
conversation Mr. Lewis made arrangements to visit with Mr. Pike
about it at the Lockhart offices.

(Lewis Deposition, pp. 23;

26) •

Thereafter, Mr. Lewis met with Mr. Pike at Lockhart.

As to

family financial affairs, Mrs. Lewis testified in her deposition
that while she and her husband discussed matters, her husband
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would "
23).

•• more or less handle mattera."

(Lewis Deposition, p.

Mr. Lewis was familiar with lending matters as he had at

one time been a branch office manager for a finance company.
(Lewis Deposition p. 8).

At the time that the Lewis' were

seeking the $18,000 loan from Lockhart, Mr. Lewis was a financial
programmer at Hill Field.

(Lewis Deposition pp. 6-7).

Mr. Lewis

returned home after the meeting with Mr. Pike with a loan application, and thereafter most of the signature page of the loan
application was typed by Mrs. Lewis, and the document was executed by both she and her husband (Lewis Deposition, pp. 24-25,
29 and 30; Lewis Dep., Exh. 1).
Loan Closing
On July 2, 1979, both Mr. and Mrs. Lewis went to Lockhart to
meet with Mr. Pike concerning the closing of the $18,000 loan.
{Lewis Deposition, p. 31.)

This meeting lasted approximately 30

minutes during which the loan documents were executed.
Deposition, p.

34).

As each document was presented for execu-

tion, Mr. Pike explained it to the Lewis'.
34).

(Lewis

(Lewis Deposition, p.

Among the documents executed by the Lewis' was an

"Assignment of Contract", "Notice of Right of Recission", a Trust
Deed, and a document entitled "Disclosure Statement" (Lewis
Deposition p. 32-40; Lewis Deposition, Exhs. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).
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In the Disclosure Statement executed by both Mr. and Mrs.
Lewis, the loan charges were computed.

No charges for credit

life insurance were included in the Disclosure Statement at the
time of execution.

(Lewis Deposition, Exhs. 5, 6).

This disclo-

sure form signed by the Lewis' specifically provides in boldfaced
capital letters that "credit life & disability insurance is not
required to obtain this loan.

No charge is made for credit

insurance & no credit insurance is provided unless the borrower
signs the appropriate statement below."
5, 6).

(Lewis Deposition, Exhs.

The "appropriate statement" in the form wherein one

affirmatively indicates that they desire credit life insurance
was not signed by the Lewis' and thus credit life insurance could
not be included in the loan.

(Lewis Deposition, Exhs. 5, 6).

During this loan closing meeting, according to Mrs. Lewis'
deposition testimony, Mrs. Lewis claims that she and her husband
discussed between themselves whether it was necessary· to have
life insurance on both of them or on Mr. Lewis.

(R. pp. 36-40).

It was during this alleged conversation with her husband allegedly in front of Mr.

Pike that Mrs. Lewis claims that she indi-

cated to her husband that she did not want a loan without
mortgage insurance on her husband and that Mr. Pike allegedly
indicated that they could let him know at a later date.
36-40).

(R. pp.

According to the testimony of Mrs. Lewis, at the conclu-

sion of this discussion between Mr.

Lewis and his wife, Mr.

Lewis then turned and allegedly asked Mr. Pike if he could let
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him know about the insurance and Mr. Pike said yes.
Deposition, pp. 37-40).

(Lewis

Thus, at the loan closing, Mr. Pike was

given no affirmative direction from the Lewis' to actually add in
credit life insurance with the loan and the disclosure statement
itself was executed by the Lewis' without insurance being
included since no direction was given to include it.

This is

confirmed by Mr. Pike who states that he was never directed to
add credit life insurance.
Deposition, p.

(R. pp. 24-25).

(Also, Thomas Pike

28).

Acceptance and Utilization of the Loan Proceeds by the Lewis'
After the aforesaid July 2, 1979, closing and during the
remainder of the month of July, 1979, the record discloses that
no request for credit life insurance was made by either Mr. or
Mrs. Lewis.

Per the record, the only contact by either of the

Lewis' during July with Lockhart and Mr. Pike after the closing
on July 2, 1979, was when a check for the loan proceeds was
picked up by the Lewis'.

The $18,000 check issued by Lockhart

and dated July 12, 1979, was made payable to both Darrel E. Lewis
and Beth

s.

Lewis.

(Lewis Deposition, Exh. 5-6).

In her deposition, Mrs. Lewis testified that she was present
with her husband when the check was picked up stating that
n

..•

I feel I saw Mr. Pike that day and we were leaving for

California and Mr. Pike said to have a good trip.

I did see him

the day we went in and picked up the check and we were leaving
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for California, and Mr. Pike said to have a good trip."
Deposition, p. 41).

(Lewis

Mrs. Lewis also testified in her deposition

that after the check was picked up, Mr. Lewis put it into the
bank and that they then used the proceeds to pay debts.
Deposition, p. 36).

(Lewis

The record is clear that at the time the

check was picked up, no direction of any kind whatsoever was
given to Mr. Pike or Lockhart to add in credit life insurance as
there is no evidence in the record that the subject was even
discussed when the check was picked-up.
36 and 41).

(Lewis Deposition, pp.

(Pike Deposition, p. 41).

The Period of Time After the Loan Proceeds Were Used
Other than the picking up of the loan proceeds check with her
husband in July, 1979, the appellant Mrs. Lewis never nad any
further conversation or meeting with Mr. Pike until after her
husband's death in September, 1979.
40-41).

(Lewis Deposition pp.

Mrs. Lewis testified that her husband went in to see Mr.

Pike in the early part of August, 1979, but that Mr. Pike was not
in.

(Lewis Deposition p.

42).

She also testified that around

the middle of August her husband tried to reach Mr. Pike on the
telephone but he was not in.

(Lewis Deposition pp. 44-46).

Mrs. Lewis suggests in her deposition that Mr. Pike indicated
that he (Pike) had not reached Mr. Lewis, but Mr. Pike's
Affidavit states that he (Pike) talked to Mr. Lewis in late
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August or early September, 1979.
24-25).

(Lewis Deposition p. 49; R. pp.

However, even if one were to assume there is a dispute

whether Mr. Pike talked to Mr. Lewis in late August or early
September, 1979, there is no dispute that at least Mr. Pike tried
to contact Mr. Lewis (Lewis Deposition, p. 49; Thomas Pike
Deposition, p. 29).

Further, it is clear that the record disclo-

ses no evidence that during this period of time (after July,
1979), an affirmative direction to obtain credit life insurance
was ever given by either Mr. or Mrs. Lewis to Lockhart.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS IT IS UNCONTROVERTED THAT INSURANCE WAS NOT
REQUESTED AT THE TIME THE LOAN
WAS CLOSED.
A close and careful review of the record in this case shows
that there is no material fact in controversy, thus substantiating respondents' right to summary judgment as granted by the
lower court.

As is set forth in more particularity hereinafter,

the appellant's attempt in her brief to demonstrate a factual
conflict fails to reveal that such a conflict actually exists as
to a material fact.
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The appellant's complaint filed in this action alleges that
the request for credit life insurance was made at the time of the
negotiation and execution of documents:
During the course of negotiation and execution of the loan application and disclosure
statements, the plaintiff and her husband,
Darrel Lewis, indicated to defendant Thomas
Pike that they would like credit life
insurance included in the loan transaction to
be taken out on the life of Darrel Lewis, and
requested defendant Pike to obtain the
necessary insurance from the credit life
writer utilized by defendant Lockhart, to wit
defendant A.B.L.A. (R. p. 3)
(Emphasis added)
Then the complaint goes on to allege that "Subsequent to July 2,
1979, the plaintiff's deceased husband made numerous efforts to
confirm the inclusion of credit life insurance and to obtain the
necessary premium figure to include in his monthly payment

"

(R.

p. 3).

(Emphasis added)

The thrust of the appellant's allegations is that there was a
definite request for credit life insurance made prior to or at
the time the loan documents were executed on July 2, 1979, (the
"closing") and then thereafter the so-called "efforts" of Mr.
Lewis was to confirm the inclusion of the insurance.

The grava-

men of the complaint is that the respondent Thomas Pike errored
in not obtaining the requested insurance which was "allegedly"
ordered prior to or at the closing.

Plainly and simply, the

record shows undisputedly that there was no request made for
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insurance prior to the closing, and further, no request was
actually made at the closing itself.
A.

Per Written Agreement, Insurance on the Life of
Darrel Lewis was not Requested.

There is no dispute that the closing loan documents were executed by the plaintiff and her husband on July 2, 1979, (Lewis
Deposition, p. 34).

Further, admittedly each one of the docu-

ments executed by Mr. and Mrs. Lewis at the closing were
explained to them by Mr. Pike.

(Lewis Deposition, p. 34).

Included among the closing documents

wa~

the one entitled

"Disclosure Statement", (Lewis Deposition, Exh. 5, 6).

The

disclosure document itself provides spaces wherein the computations are set forth as to the loan charges.

Credit life

insurance computations were not included in the said spaces and
thus the loan finance charges clearly did not include credit life
insurance when the disclosure statement was signed by the Lewis'.
Further, apart from the sections of the disclosure statement
wherein the actual computed charges for insurance must be set
out, there is also the following written in bold faced capital
letters:
CREDIT LIFE & DISABILITY INSURANCE IS NOT
REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THIS LOAN. NO CHARGE IS
MADE FOR CREDIT INSURANCE & NO CREDIT
INSURANCE IS PROVIDED UNLESS THE BORROWER
SIGNS THE APPROPRIATE STATEMEN~ BELOW.
(Emphasis in form and added).
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Neither the appellant nor her husband

~igned

the document in the

space provided where it is necessary for one to elect to include
insurance along with the additional cost.

This, of course, makes

the document inherently consistent since the costs for the
insurance were not included in the mathematical computations
showing the loan charges.
The Disclosure Statement was explained and it was executed by
the Lewis'.

It is a binding agreement and an acknowledgement on

the part of the appellant as well as her deceased husband concerning the fact that no credit life insurance was requested at
the time of the loan closing and thus none was included at the
time in the loan charges.
The execution of the disclosure form by the Lewis' concluded
the matter as to there being no request for insurance.

Any

alleged prior negotiations or discussions as well as any contemporaneous discussions could not vary the terms of the written
understanding.

In the case of State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey et.

al., 565 P.2d 413 (1977) the Utah Supreme Court stated that:

The court properly adhered to the principle that when the parties have reduced to
writing what appears to be a complete and certain agreement, it will be conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the
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writing contains the whole of the agreement
between the parties. Also, that parol evidence of contemporaneous conversations, representations or statements will not be received
for the purpose of varying or adding to the
terms of the written agreement.
(p. 418)
(Emphasis added)
(See also Rainford v.
Rytting, 451 P.2d 769 (Utah 1969)).
At pages 8 and 9 of her brief, appellant argues that the portion of the Disclosure Statement where it states "I do not want
Credit Life or Disability Insurance" was not signed either.

It

is not required that this portion of the form be executed.
Insurance is not added to a loan (including its extra cost)
unless requested.

If one wants insurance, it must be

acknowledged and then the cost of such must be included in the
disclosure.
In her argument (Brief, pp. 8-9) appellant makes references
to the deposition of Mr. Thomas Pike concerning this matter,
which deposition is apparently not with the record and may not
have been published at the lower court level.
dents do not object to its full use.

T~e

However, respon-

reference by the

appellant to Mr. Pike's deposition is incomplete and does not set
out the proper context of his statement as to why one must sign

if they want insurance, but don't need to sign if they don't want
it.

Appellant has overlooked Mr. Pike's testimony that it is an
advantage to sell insurance as there is premium income.

(Pike
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Deposition, p. 41)

Pike explains that the space provided to sign

if one doesn't want insurance is not required in the disclosure
form but is more of a marketing tool:
Q.

I presume that you must have had some
conversation directly with Mr. and Mrs.
Lewis regarding those two aspects before
Exhibit 1 was prepared? (Exhibit 1 is
the Disclosure Statement)

A.

That is true.

Q.

When did that conversation or conversations occur?

A.

Again, it seemed to me we had several
conversations between the time of making
the application and actually finalizing
it. When he determined how long he
wanted the loan and when he wanted the
insurance, we always came to an agreement
and we did with Darrel in advance of the
closing as to yes or no on the insurance.
At that point in time there was not a
decision to have insurance. There was a
decision not to have insurance and that
is why the disclosure was filled out the
way it was.

Q.

Okay. Why wasn't the blank, then, for
the signatures, affixed to the part of
the application that says, "I do not want
credit life insurance"?

A.

I'm just not sure totally in this case.
This is done at the time of closing when
we are together.

Q.

Let me ask this.
closing?

A.

I was.

Were you present at the
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Q.

Was anyone else from the Lockhart Company
present?

A.

No.

Q.

The normal procedure of the Lockhart
Company in the processing of loans where
credit life is refused by, or I guess
refused is the right word, by the
borrower would be to complete this middle
section of the form under "I do not want
credit life or disability insurance" and
to have the borrowers sign and date that,
isn't it?

A.

Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't.

Q.

Okay. Why would it not be?
the form?

A.

It is a marketing tool. That is why it
is on the form and we like to use it.
The other signatures that are called for
there, Mr. Hintze, if they do want
insurance, they must sign by law. So we
have to - that has to be done.

Why is it on

The other is very helpful of ten in
helping someone to decide they want
some insurance. (Pike Deposition, pp.
20-21).
(Emphasis added).
Thus, to have insurance one must sign the form so indicating.
The part that one may sign indicating no insurance need not be
signed as it is a marketing tool.
disputing this explanation.

There is nothing in the record

The disclosure form was completed

and executed without requesting credit life insurance, and parol
evidence is inappropriate as a written understanding came into
existence.
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B.

Even If, Arguendo, Parol Evidence is Admissible With
Respect to the Execution of Documents at the Closing,
the Uncontroverted Evidence is Clear That There was no
Request for Credit Life Insurance.

Even if, arguendo only, one could suggest that parol evidence
should be considered as to whether or not credit life insurance
was requested on July 2, 1979, (even in light of the written
disclosure statement wherein there was no election made for
insurance) the testimony of the appellant makes it most clear
that such was not the case.

It only further substantiates the

already clear written understanding, supra, that there was no
request for credit life insurance.
The appellant testified in deposition as follows:
Q:

And do you recall having any discussion with respect to
this document that has been marked as Exhibit 5?
(Referring to Disclosure Statement)

A:

Correct, yes.

Q:

First of all, I will ask you to identify who said
anything about it. Not what, but who.

* * *
A:

My husband and I.

Q:

Was the conversation you had in the presence of Mr.
Pike?

A:

Yes, it was.

Q:

Now with respect to your husband, could you tell me what
it was that he said and maybe first of all you could put
it in quotation marks.
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A:

My husband and I discussed whether it was necessary to
have life insurance on both of us or just himself,
mortgage insurance on both of us or himself.

Q:

That was a discussion you had between yourselves?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Mr. Pike was present during that conversation?

A:

Yes.

Q:

What did you say to your husband?

A:

We felt we'd like to discuss it further, whether it
was necessary to have it on me.

Q:

Is that something that you said to your husband, that
you ought to discuss it further, or is that something he
said to you?

A:

I said I feel we should discuss it further, whether it
was necessary to have it on me or both of us. Is that
what you were asking?

Q:

So you said you should discuss it further?

A:

Yes.

Q:

At another time?

A:

And get back with Mr. Pike on it.

Q:

Did your husband just agree with you, that you ought to
discuss it later?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did either one of you express a feeling or indication at
that time whether you ought to be covered or not?

A:

That's what we discussed, whether I should be covered
also.

Q:

And it wasn't a case where one of you thought you should
be covered and one thought you shouldn't be covered and
you would resolve it later?

A:

No.
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Q:

Neither one of you knew for sure whether you ought to be
covered?

A:

I felt that it wasn't necessary that I should be
covered.

(Lewis Deposition p. 37-39)

(Emphasis added)

Appellant further makes it clear that on July 2, 1979 -

(closing)

there was no actual direction for the credit life insurance to be
included:
A:

Only that I definitely did not want a loan without
mortgage insurance on my husba~d and Mr. Pike indicated
that we could let him know at a later date whether it
should be on both of us or just my husband and he would
leave it open until he heard from us.

Q:

Now, is this something you said to your husband that Mr.
Pike overhead, or --

A:

Mr. Pike was there and heard the whole conversation.

Q:

So as you remember, then, can you remember any exact words
that you would have said to your husband?

A:

Only that I felt it was necessary that he have mortgage
insurance.

Q:

Do you recall anything your husband said to you?

A:

He felt the same way.

Q:

And what did he say? Do you recall anything that he
actually said rather than what he felt?

A:

He turned and asked Mr. Pike if he could let him know
and Mr. Pike said yes.

Q:

Is there anything else that you can remember that took
place.

A:

No.

(Lewis Deposition p. 39-40)

(Emphasis added)
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It is clear, then, even if one could consider parol evidence,
that the appellant and her husband on July 2, 1979, did not
direct that insurance should be included.

Since there was no

request per se, such could not be added into the loan charges.

A

lender in such a situation would have no prerogative to do so.
So at the time the documents were executed, credit life insurance
was appropriately not included as a component.
Appellant's complaint allegations are not supported by the
sworn testimony of the appellant.

It is patently clear that at

the time of the closing, (as well as prior thereto) no direction
was given to include credit life insurance.
POINT II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE EVEN
IF, ARGUENDO, THERE WAS ANY QUESTION AT
THE CLOSING AS TO WHETHER THE MATTER OF
INSURANCE WAS LEFT OPEN, IT WAS PUT TO REST
WHEN APPELLANT UNCONDITIONALLY ACCEPTED THE
LOAN PROCEEDS LATER THAT MONTH
After the loan closing on July 2, 1979, the record discloses
that there was no other contact from either Mr. or Mrs. Lewis
with any representative of Lockhart during July except for the
time that both of them met Mr. Pike briefly to pick up the
$18,000 loan proceeds check.

At the time the Lewis' picked up

the proceeds (check dated July 12, 1979) the uncontroverted
record is that nothing was said at that time about desiring to
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have credit life insurance.

Per the record, credit life

insurance wasn't even a subject discussed.

Plainly and simply

the check was unconditionally picked up and the proceeds
utilized:
Q.

And when would you have first seen the
document or writing of which this appears
to be a Xerox copy?

A.

We came in and picked the check up. This
was approximately two weeks later after
we applied for the loan. I'm sorry. I
cannot tell you for sure.

Q.

You are not sure whether your husband
picked this up

A.

No, I was with him.

Q.

Were you with him when the check was
picked up?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Then with respect to this check do you
recall also that it had the bottom portion attached to the check?

A.

I am sorry. I really have to say I don't
remember but I would say it did.

Q.

And then after you picked up that check
what did you do with it?

A.

He put it in the bank and we made checks
out on it to each one of the people that
he had specified and paid off the debts
that he had borrowed it for.

Q.

And where would it have been deposited,
which bank?

A.

Zion's First National.

Q.

In Salt Lake City?
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A.

No, Bountiful.

(Lewis Deposition, pp. 35-36).
added).

(Emphasis

Later in her deposition, Mrs. Lewis confirmed her presence when
the check was picked up and the record further shows that no
request was made on that occasion for credit life insurance:
Q.

So you yourself never really saw Mr.
Pike, then, before July 2, 1979 and
September 17, 1979?

A.

Not as I recall.

Q.

I think you best remembered you went in
to pick up the check and who would you
have gotten that check from? I'm
referring now to what's marked as Exhibit
5.

A.

I do feel that I did see - I'm sorry to
take it back but I feel I saw Mr. Pike
that day and we were leaving for
California and Mr. Pike said to have a
good trip. I did see him the day we went
in and picked up the check and we were
leaving for California, and Mr. Pike said
to have a good trip.

Q.

So other than that occasion you don't
have any recollection of seeing Mr. Pike
between July 2 and September 17?

A.

No.

(Lewis Deposition, p. 41).

In her brief the appellant ignores this material event.
Appellant's complaint alleges that the request for insurance was
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made at the closing if not before, and yet in her brief appellant
seems to contradict her pleadings to suggest the issue was left
open at the closing.

Thus, ignoring the pleadings of the

appellant and even assuming her contrary argument that the issue
was left open on July 2, 1979, (the· closing), it was no longer
left open on or about July 12, 1979, when the Lewis' picked up
the proceeds check.
Thus, even assuming that appellant is able to get around the
executed written disclosure form and to be heard to argue that
the matter was left open pending the Lewis' response, under
applicable law the response was given t7 the Lewis' thus
concluding a contract.

Under principles of contract law, mani-

festation of assent "

• may be either written or oral or by

actions and conduct or a combination thereof • • • • "
Const. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 819 (Utah 1952).

Daum
The Lewis'

unconditional acceptance of the proceeds was their clear and unequivocal response to and acceptance of the loan without credit
life insurance.

Appellant should not be permitted to ignore the

unconditional acceptance, as even principles somewhat akin to
estoppel would come into play -- " • • • conduct by one party
which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course
of action resulting in detriment or damage ef the first party is
permitted to repudiate his conduct."
572 P.2d 708, 712 (Ut.

1977).

Carnesecca v. Carnesecca,

See also 31 C.J.S. §109.
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Mr. and Mrs. Lewis took advantage of receiving the loan proceeds and applying them.to their benefic without any further comment to Mr. Pike about credit life insurance.

Mr. Lewis had been

involved in the past in the lending business and thus borrowing
matters were not something new to him.

If the issue had been

left open at the closing, arguendo, then by appellant's own
actions, the proceeds were accepted without any direction given
for insurance or any other condition.

The Lewis' themselves

closed any open issue by their own assent and acceptance.
POINT III.
AS TO THE TIME PERIOD AFTER THE DISBURSAL OF THE
LOAN PROCEEDS IN JULY, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHICH
COULD BE CONSIDERED BY A TRIER OF FACT TO ESTABLISH
THERE HAD BEEN A REQUEST FOR CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE
AND THUS SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER.
As set forth, supra, the complaint states that a request for
the insurance was made at the time of the execution of the documents, if not before.

Discussion by appellant concerning later

contacts really goes beyond her own pleadings.

However, even if

the appellant may get around her pleadings, there is no evidence
which could be considered by a trier of fact concerning a request
for credit life insurance during the period of time after the
loan proceeds had been disbursed, accepted and utilized in July,
1979.

First, any "open" question about whether insurance was to be
included was put to rest when the Lewis' elected to accept the
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proceeds and utilize them without their requesting it.

Second,

during the period after July, 1979, it is uncontradicted in the
record that appellant herself never made any contact with Mr.
Pike nor attempted to do so.

Further, in the argument under

Point III in her brief, appellant asserts that Mr.
not necessarily be the agent of his wife.

Lewis would

Assuming appellant's

own argument, any attempt by Mr. Lewis to contact Lockhart after
the disbursal of the loan in July, 1979, was irrelevant as it was
not an attempt on behalf of Mrs. Lewis and thus appellant herself
clearly made no attempt to contact Lockhart after receiving the
benefit of the loan proceeds.

Per the record, appellant never

made any contact of any kind or nature whatsoever with Lockhart
until after the death of her husband.

The record is also absolu-

tely clear that appellant never asked Lockhart to contact her
after she got the loan proceeds.

Thus, during the latter period

(after the loan disbursal in July, 1979), appellant has nothing
about which to complain as she herself did nothing in her own
behalf and no duty was placed on Lockhart as the loan was closed
and disbursed.
Now, assuming, arguendo, that the appellant is not held to
the argument made in Point III of her brief and appellant may
rely on her husband as her agent in trying to contact Lockhart,
there is still nothing after July, 1979 on which a claim can be
based.

Mr. Pike in his affidavit states that in late August,
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1979, or in early September, 1979, he did in fact talk to Darrel

Lewis " . . • and gave him certain information about credit life
insurance • • • • " (R. pp. 24-25).

Although Mrs. Lewis in her

deposition suggests that Mr. Pike had indicated in a conversation
with her in September, 1979, that he had not reached Mr. Lewis,
she does state in her deposition that Mr. Pike said that he had
tried to reach Mr. Lewis.

(Lewis Deposition p. 49, Pike

Deposition, p. 29).
Even if one were to assume that ther.e may be a question as to
whether or not Mr. Pike actually talked to Mr. Lewis in August or
September of 1979, there is no conflict in the record that at
least Pike attempted to contact Lewis.

However, there is still

no evidence of any kind whatsoever in the record that any direction was given in a note or otherwise to Mr. Pike that credit
insurance was to be instituted.

The note referred to by

appellant in her brief (pp. 5 and 11) does not say "add
insurance" nor does it contain any other such language requesting
insurance.!/

1/

Further, Mr. Pike explains in his deposition that
insurance after the loan is closed, other further
ment execution is then required of the borrowers
was clearly never accomplished. (Pike Depositio~
34-37).

to add
docuwh i ch
pp.
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Appellant attempts to argue that the lower court was using
the note referred to in appellant's brief to establish the truth
of the contents in the note, thus allegedly being contrary to the
hearsay rule.

The note is not even necessary in the granting of

the summary judgment, as argued, supra.

However, based upon the

objective theory of contracts, the note at face value only makes
a request for information and nothing else.

Even assuming

appellant's argument that the note shouldn't be accepted as indieating that appellant didn't want insurance, i.e. that it
shouldn't be considered to show appellant's negative intent, it
still does not by any stretch of interpretation state that
insurance was wanted or that it should be added.

On its objec-

tive face, the note clearly is not a request or direction for
insurance.

Thus, there is nothing in the record showing a

request for insurance and there is nothing showing that respondents violated any duty.
POINT IV.
LOAN WAS PAID WITHOUT
RESERVATION OF ANY RIGHTS
In her deposition, appellant admits that in latter September,
1979, she knew there was no credit insurance.
p. 46).

(Lewis Deposition,

With this knowledge, appellant paid off the entire loan

balance in November, 1979.

(Lewis Deposition, p. 50-52).

According to the deposition testimony, at the time of the payoff,
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there were no conditions or reservations made by Mrs. Lewis with
respect to the payment and thus payment was unconditionally made.
(Lewis Deposition, p. 50-52).

Such action is contrary to

appellant's asserted claim thus a giviug up or waiving of any
alleged claim.
CONCLUSION
The action of the lower Court in granting summary judgment
should be sustained.

No direction for insurance was given at the

closing and the appellant got the benefit of the loan proceeds
and gave no direction for insurance at said time.
violated by the respondents.

No duty was

There is no material issue of fact

in the matter justifying the time and expense of a trial.

The

lower court's action was proper.
DATED this

;{9;3ay

of April, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,

Gif for
• \ rice
Greene Ca lister & Nebeker
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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